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Abstract: We consider a series of companies in a supply chain, each of which orders from its 
immediate upstream members. Usually, the retailer's order do not coincide with the actual retail 
sales. The bullwhip effect refers to the phenomenon where orders to the supplier tend to have larger 
variance than sales to the buyer (i.e. demand distortion), and the distortion propagates upstream in 
an amplified form (i.e. variance amplification). We show that if the members of the supply chain 
share information, and agree on better and better fuzzy estimates (as time advances) on future sales 
for the upcoming period, then the bullwhip effect can be essentially reduced.  
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1. Introduction 
The Bullwhip Effect has been the focus of systematic theoretical work only in 
recent years. The first articles to report on research results in a more systematic 
fashion [5] have been published only recently. The effect is often identified with 
the simulation experiment, The Beer Game, which is used to demonstrate the 
effects of distorted in- formation in the supply chain (which is the cause of the 
bullwhip effect).  
There are some examples published which demonstrate the bullwhip effect: (i) P & 
G has over the years been successful producers and sellers of Pampers, and they 
have seen that babies are reliable and steady consumers; (ii) the retailers, however, 
show fluctuating sales, although the demand should be easy to estimate as soon as 
the number of babies is known; (iii) P & G found out that the orders they received 
from distributors showed a strong variability, in fact much stronger than could be 
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explained by the fluctuating sales of the retailers; finally, (iv) when P &G studied 
their own orders to 3M for raw material they found these to be wildly fluctuating, 
actually much more than could be explained by the orders from the distributors.  
The context we have chosen for this study is the forest products industry and the 
markets for fine paper products. The supply chain is thus a business-to-business 
chain, and we will show that the bullwhip effect is as dominant as in the 
business-to-consumer supply chain.  
The key driver of the bullwhip effect appears to be that the variability of the 
estimates or the forecasts of customer demand seems to amplify as the orders move 
up the supply chain from the customer, through retailers and wholesalers to the 
producer of the product or service. This is called the bullwhip, the whiplash or the 
whipsaw effect.  
In a number of studies, it appears that the bullwhip effect will have a number of 
negative effects and that it will cause significant inefficiencies:  
1. Excessive inventory investments throughout the supply chain as retailers, 
distributors, logistics operators and producers need to safeguard themselves 
against the variations.  
2. Poor customer service as some part of the supply chain runs out of products due 
to the variability and insufficient means for coping with the variations.  
3. Lost revenues due to shortages, which have been caused by the variations.  
4. The productivity of invested capital in operations becomes substandard as 
revenues are lost.  
5. Decision-makers react to the fluctuations in demand and make investment 
decisions or change capacity plans to meet peak demands. These decisions are 
probably misguided, as peak demands may be eliminated by reorganisations of 
the supply chain.  
6. Demand variations cause variations in the logistics chain, which again cause 
fluctuations in the planned use of transportation capacity. This will again produce 
sub-optimal transportation schemes and increase transportation costs.  
7. Demand fluctuations caused by the bullwhip effect may cause missed production 
schedules, which actually are completely unnecessary, as there are no real 
changes in the demand, only inefficiencies in the supply chain.  
There are some studies [5], which have revealed four key reasons for the 
occurrence of the bullwhip effect. These include (i) the updating of demand 
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forecasts, (ii) order batching, (iii) price fluctuations and (iv) rationing and shortage 
gaming.  
The updating of demand forecasts appears to be a major source of the bullwhip 
effect.  
The parties of the supply chain build their forecasts on the historical demand 
patterns of their immediate customers. In this way, only the retailers build on the 
actual demand patterns of the customers, the other parties adjust to (unmotivated) 
fluctuations in the ordering policies of those preceding them in the supply chain. 
Another effect will also occur: if everybody reacts to fluctuations with smoothing 
techniques (like exponential smoothing), the fluctuations will amplify up through 
the supply chain. It appears that safety stocks, which are popular smoothing 
devices, will actually amplify the bullwhip effect.  
The order batching will appear in two different forms: (i) periodic ordering and (ii) 
push ordering. In the first case there are a number reasons for building batches of 
individual orders. The costs for frequent order processing may be high, which will 
force customers into periodic ordering; this will in most cases destroy customer 
demand patterns. There are material requirement planning systems in use, which 
are run periodically and thus will cause that orders are placed periodically. 
Logistics operators often favor FTL-batches and will determine their tariffs 
accordingly. These reasons for periodic ordering are quite rational, and will, when 
acted upon, amplify variability and contribute to the bullwhip effect. Push ordering 
occurs, as the sales people employed by the producers try to meet their 
end-of-quarter or end-of-year bonus plans.  
The effect of this is to amplify the variability with orders from customers 
overlapping end-of-quarter and beginning-of-quarter months, to destroy 
connections with the actual demand patterns of customers and to contribute to the 
bullwhip effect.  
The producers initiate and control the price fluctuations for various reasons. 
Customers are driven to buy in larger quantities by attractive offers on quantity 
discounts, price discounts, coupons or rebates. Their behavior is quite rational: to 
make the optimal use of opportunities when prices shift between high and low. The 
problem introduced by this behavior is that buying patterns will not reflect 
consumption patterns anymore, customers buy in quantities which do not reflect 
their needs. This will amplify the bullwhip effect. The consequences are that 
producers (rightfully) suffer: manufacturing is on overtime during campaigns, 
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premium transportation rates are paid during peak seasons and products suffer 
damages in overflowing storage spaces.  
The rationing and shortage gaming occurs when demand exceeds supply. If the 
producers once have met shortages with a rationing of customer deliveries, the 
customers will start to exaggerate their real needs when there is a fear that supply 
will not cover demand. The shortage of DRAM chips and the following strong 
fluctuations in demand was a historic case of the rationing and shortage game. The 
bullwhip effect will amplify even further if customers are allowed to cancel orders 
when their real demand is satisfied. The gaming leaves little information on real 
demand and will confuse the demand patterns of customers.  
It is a fact that these four causes of the bullwhip effect may be hard to monitor, and 
even harder to control in the forest products industry. We should also be aware of 
the fact that the four causes may interact, and act in concert, and that the resulting 
combined effects are not clearly understood, neither in theory nor in practice. It is 
also probably the case that the four causes are dependent on the supply chain's 
infrastructure and on the strategies used by the various actors.  
The factors driving the bullwhip effect appear to form a hyper-complex, i.e. a 
system where factors show complex interactive patterns. The theoretical challenges 
posed by a hyper-complex merit study, even if significant economic consequences 
would not have been involved. The costs incurred by the consequences of the 
bullwhip effect offer a few more reasons for carrying out serious work on the 
mechanisms driving the bullwhip. Thus, we have built a theory to explain at least 
some of the factors and their interactions, and we have created a support system to 
come to terms with them and to find effective means to either reduce or eliminate 
the bullwhip effect.  
With a little simplification there appears to be three possible approaches to 
counteract the bullwhip effect:  
 
1. Find some means to share information from downstream of the supply chain 
with all the preceding actors.  
 
2. Build channel alignment with the help of some co-ordination of pricing, 
transportation, inventory planning and ownership - when this is not made illegal 
by anti-trust legislation.  
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3. Improve operational efficiency by reducing cost and by improving on lead times.  
 
The first approach can probably be focused on finding some good technology to 
accomplish the information sharing, as this can be shown to be beneficial for all the 
actors operating in the supply chain.  
The second approach can first be focused on some non-controversial element, such 
as the co-ordination of transportation or inventory planning, and then the alignment 
can be widened to explore possible interactions with other elements.  
 
The third approach is probably straight-forward: find inefficiencies in operations in 
selected strategic business units (SBUs), find ways to reduce costs and to improve 
on lead times, and explore if these solutions can be generalised for more actors in 
the supply chain.  
 
The most effective - and the most challenging - effort will be to find ways to 
combine elements of all three approaches and to find synergistic programs, which 
will have the added benefit of being very resource-effective, to eliminate the 
bullwhip effect.  
 
2. The Bullwhip Effect in the Forest Products Industry 
The two corporate members of the EM-S Bullwhip consortium had observed the 
bullwhip effects in their own markets and in their own supply chains for fine paper 
products.  
 
They also readily agreed that the bullwhip effect is causing problems and 
significant costs, and that any good theory or model, which could give some insight 
into dealing with the bullwhip effect, would be a worthwhile effort in terms of both 
time and resources.  
 
There are several reasons why the bullwhip effect occurs in the fine paper products 
market. The first reason is to be found in the structure of the market (cf. fig. 1):  
 
The paper mills do not deal directly with their end-customers, but fine paper 
products are distributed through wholesalers, merchants and retailers. The paper 
producers may Silvaculture & Timber Farming Logging & Chipping Pulp 
Manufacturing Paper Manufacturing Converting Operations Merchanting & 
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Distribution End-Users [Printing houses, etc.] Figure 1: The supply chain of the 
market for fine paper products. 
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Figure 1: The supply chain of the market for fine paper products. 
 
(i) own some of the operators in the market supply chain, (ii) they may share some 
of them with competitors or (iii) the operators may be completely independent and 
bound to play the market game with the paper producers. The operators in the 
market supply chain do not willingly share their customer and market data, 
information and knowledge with the paper producers.  
Thus, the paper producers do not get neither precise nor updated information on 
the real customer demand, but get it in a filtered and/or manipulated way from the 
market supply chain operators. Market data is collected and summarised by 
independent data providers, and market forecasts are produced by professional 
forest products consultants and market study agencies, but still it appears that these 
macro level studies and forecasts do not exactly apply for the markets of a single 
paper producer. The market information needed for individual operations still 
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needs to come from the individual market. Here the operators of the market supply 
chain control access to the data sources, and the paper producer is forced to build 
his demand forecasts on the numbers he get from the wholesaler or merchant part 
of the market supply chain.  
The second reason for the bullwhip effect to occur is found earlier in the supply 
chain.  
The demand and price fluctuations of the pulp markets dominate also the demand 
and price patterns of the paper products markets, even to such an extent, that the 
customers for paper products anticipate the expectations on changes in the pulp 
markets and act accordingly. If pulp prices decline, or are expected to decline, 
demand for paper products will decline, or stop in anticipation of price reductions. 
Then, eventually, prices will in fact go down as the demand has disappeared and 
the paper producers get nervous. The initial reason for fluctuations in the pulp 
market may be purely speculative, or may have no reason at all. Thus, the 
construction of any reasonable, explanatory cause-effect relationships to find out 
the market mechanisms that drive the bullwhip may be futile. If we want to draw 
an even more complex picture we could include the interplay of the operators in the 
market supply chain: their anticipations of the reactions of the other operators and 
their individual, rational (possibly even optimal) strategies to decide how to 
operate. This is a later task, to work out a composite bullwhip effect among the 
market supply chain operators, as we cannot deal with this more complex aspect 
here.  
The third reason for the bullwhip effect is order batching. The logistics systems 
favour the shipping of larger batches of paper products, the building of inventories 
in the supply chain to meet demand fluctuations and push ordering to meet 
end-of-quarter or end-of-year financial needs. The logistics operators are quite 
often independent of both the paper producers and the wholesalers and/or retailers, 
which will make them want to operate in such a way that their result and financial 
goals are met. Thus they decide their own tariffs in such a way that their operations 
are effective and profitable, which will - in turn - affect the decisions of the market 
supply chain operators, including the paper producers. The adjustment to proper 
shipload or FTL batches will drive the bullwhip effect.  
There is a fourth reason for the bullwhip effect, which is caused by the paper 
producers themselves. There are attempts at influencing or controlling the paper 
products markets by having occasional low price campaigns or special offers. The 
market supply chain operators react by speculating in the timing and the level of 
low price offers and will use the (rational) policy of buying only at low prices for a 
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while. The nervous reactions and speculations of all the players drive the bullwhip 
effect.  
There is a fifth and final explanation for the bullwhip effect, the so-called rationing 
and shortage game. This would be the case when demand in paper products 
markets outgrow the production capacity and the supply chain operators cannot fill 
their orders.  
If they get less than their needs in some period, they will try to compensate for this 
in their next order by anticipating the rationing and ordering more than their actual 
needs. If the policy allows for not taking delivery of excessive orders, or if there is 
sufficient inventory capacity, the rationing game will drive the bullwhip effect. It is 
questionable if this factor will play any role in the paper products market, as the 
rule for the last decade seems to have been that there is more production capacity 
available than needed.  
The bullwhip effect may be illustrated as in fig.2. The variations shown in fig.2 are 
simplifications, but the following patterns appear: (i) the printer (an end-customer) 
orders once per quarter according to the real market demand his has or is 
estimating; (ii) the dealer meets this demand and anticipates that the printer may 
need more (or less) than he orders; the dealer acts somewhat later than his 
customer; (iii) the paper mill reacts to the dealer's orders in the same fashion and 
somewhat later than the dealer. The resulting overall effect is the bullwhip effect.  
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Figure 2: The bullwhip effect in the paper products market. 
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In the following section, we will present the standard theory for explaining the 
bullwhip and for coming to terms with it.  
3. Explanations for the bullwhip effect: Standard Results 
The first detailed, theoretical discussion of the bullwhip effect was published by 
Lee et al [5] in Management Science (April 1997) and in a more popular, empirical 
version in the Sloan Management Review [6] (Spring 1997). These two papers 
were continuations of earlier studies of the benefits of co-ordination among 
members of a supply chain, which comprises manufacturers, distributors, 
wholesalers and retailers.  
A key mechanism for the co-ordination is the information flows among members 
of the supply chain, as they have a direct impact on production scheduling, 
inventory control, delivery planning and logistics solutions among the individual 
members of the supply chain. If this information flow gets distorted or interrupted 
the consequences will be felt in the production plans and the production 
scheduling, which will cause inventories to either grow rapidly or empty out, which 
again disrupts delivery planning and causes expensive logistics solutions. The 
dynamics behind this series of events - if mastered - will have a profound effect on 
how the supply chain is managed and will point the way to more productive and 
effective operations in all parts of the supply chain.  
The supply chain management is an important issue for the Finnish forest products 
industry as supply chain mismanagement, with a total turnover of more than 100 
BFIM, has consequences costing 100-200 MFIM per year.  
Lee et al focus their study on the demand information flow and work out a 
theoretical framework for studying the effects of systematic information distortion 
as information works its way through the supply chain. The distortion becomes 
visible when the retailer's orders to the wholesaler do not coincide with the actual 
retail sales. As the wholesaler reacts to his retailers orders by adding a similar 
''safety margin'' (a positive margin for growing demand, a negative margin for 
declining demand) when ordering from the producer, the distortion grows in 
magnitude.  
This means that the orders to a supplier will have larger variance than the sales to a 
buyer. The theory demonstrates and proves that the distortion propagates upstream 
in an amplified form, i.e. the variances grow as we move upstream in the supply 
chain. This phenomenon is known as the bullwhip or whiplash effect.  
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Lee et al simplifies the context for the theoretical work by defining an idealised 
situation. They start with a multiple period inventory system, which is operated 
under a periodic review policy. They include the following assumptions: (i) past 
demands are not used for forecasting, (ii) re-supply is infinite with a fixed lead 
time, (iii) there is no fixed order cost, and (iv) purchase cost of the product is 
stationary over time. If the demand is stationary, the standard optimal result for this 
type of inventory system is to order up to S, where S is a constant. The optimal 
order quantity in each period is exactly equal to the demand of the previous period, 
which means that orders and demand have the same variance (and there is no 
bullwhip effect).  
This idealised situation is useful as a starting point, as is gives a good basis for 
working out the consequences of distortion of information in terms of the variance, 
which is the indicator of the bullwhip effect. By relaxing the assumptions (i)-(iv), 
one at a time, it is possible to produce the bullwhip effect.  
3.1 Demand Signal Processing 
Lets focus on the retailer-wholesaler relationship (the framework applies also to a 
wholesaler-distributor or distributor-producer relationship). Now we consider a 
multiple period inventory model where demand is non-stationary over time and 
demand forecasts are updated from observed demand.  
Lets assume that the retailer gets a much higher demand in one period. This will be 
interpreted as a signal for higher demand in the future, the demand forecasts for 
future periods get adjusted, and the retailer reacts by placing a larger order with the 
wholesaler. As the demand is non-stationary, the optimal policy of ordering up to S 
also gets non-stationary. A further consequence is that the variance of the orders 
grows, which is starting the bullwhip effect. If the lead-time between ordering 
point and the point of delivery is long, uncertainty increases and the retailer adds a 
''safety margin'' to S, which will further increase the variance and add to the 
bullwhip effect.  
Lee et al simplifies the context even further by focusing on a single-item, multiple 
period inventory, in order to be able to work out the exact bullwhip model.  
The timing of the events is as follows: At the beginning of period t, a decision to 
order a quantity zt is made. This time point is called the ''decision point'' for period 
t. Next the goods ordered v periods ago arrive. Lastly, demand is realized, and the 
available inventory is used to meet the demand. Excess demand is backlogged. Let 
St denote the amount in stock plus on order (including those in transit) after 
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decision zt has been made for period t. Lee at al assume that the retailer faces 
serially correlated demands which follow the process 
ttt uDdD ++= −1ρ  
where Dt is the demand in period t, ρ is a constant satisfying -1 < ρ < 1, and ut is 
independent and identically normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2. 
Here σ2 is assumed to be significantly smaller than d, so that the probability of a 
negative demand is very small. The existence of d, which is some constant, basic 
demand, is doubtful; in the forest products markets a producer cannot expect to 
have any ''granted demand''. The use of d is technical, to avoid negative demand 
which will destroy the model, and it does not appear in the optimal order quantity. 
After formulating the cost minimization problem Lee et al. proved the following 
theorem,  
 
 
Theorem 3.1. [5] In the above setting, we have:  
 
1. If 0 < ρ < 1, the variance of retails orders is strictly larger than that of 
retail sales; that is,  
Var(z1) > Var(D0) 
 
2. If 0 < ρ < 1, the larger the replenishment lead time, the larger the variance 
of orders; i.e. Var(z1) is strictly increasing in v. 
 
This theorem has been proved using the relationships 
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where  denotes the optimal amount of order. Which collapses into *1z
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ρ2)()( 0*1 += DVarzVar  
for v = 0.  
The optimal order quantity is an optimal ordering policy, which sheds some new 
light on the bullwhip effect. The effect gets started by rational decision making, i.e. 
by decision makers doing the best they can. In other words, there is no hope to 
avoid the bullwhip effect by changing the ordering policy, as it is difficult to 
motivate people to act in an irrational way. Other means will be necessary (cf. 
Section 5). 
3.2 The Rationing Game 
For the second reason for the bullwhip effect, we have to change the context. Now 
we have the situation that the demand potentially exceeds supply due to limitations 
of production capacity, uncertainty of production yield, or limitations or 
disturbances of the logistics system. We will focus on limitations of production 
capacity, we will work with a single-product, one-period inventory model, and we 
will assume multiple retailers. This is also known as the newsvendor problem, after 
a classical inventory problem in operations research.  
In the forest products industry limitations of production capacity, to the extent that 
demand exceeds production capacity, is rather rare. Thus the rationing game does 
not occur very often, but we have included the theory in order to make the 
theoretical framework complete.  
Lets assume that a producer supplies a single product to n identical retailers. 
Retailer i observes the demand distribution ( )⋅Φ , and places an order zi at time 0. 
Here we have a demand, which is known through its probability distribution, and 
the retailer tries to anticipate what the demand is going to be. The producer delivers 
the order at time 1; the producer's delivery m is a random variable, distributed 
according to F (·).  
In the newsvendor problem, in which old newspapers are worthless and no 
backorders are possible, the optimal policy is to estimate the expected demand and 
its variance, and then to find an order quantity for which the marginal profit for 
adding one more newspaper to the order exactly balances the expected loss of 
leaving the order one newspaper short. Let us assume that this optimal order 
quantity is z’.  
If the total amount of orders received from the n retailers exceeds the production 
quantity m, the producer will allocate products to the retailers in relation to their 
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orders; if the total amount of orders is less than m, then all retailers will get the 
amounts they ordered. The question now is what the optimal order quantity zi of 
retailer i should be?  
The model gets rather complicated as it turns out that the retailer should not only 
try to estimate the expected demand and its variance, and then use the newsvendor 
solution, but should also in ordering try to anticipate what the other n - 1 retailers 
will do. The policy would be to order more than the expected demand in 
anticipation of rationing in order to make sure that the actual delivery will satisfy 
the expected demand. The only problematic issue is to decide how much to 
exaggerate and also to find out if the coming period will be one in which the 
production capacity will not b enough to satisfy all retailers. The model to be used 
for this is the classical Nash equilibrium model, which shows how to decide the 
optimal ordering policy (minimising expected cost = holding cost + ordering cost + 
shortage cost) when n - 1 other rational decision makers optimal decisions are 
given. There is an optimal ordering policy for retailer i, which is found at an 
equilibrium point - the so-called Nash equilibrium - which ensures that none of the 
retailers should try to exaggerate more than any other retailer.  
The result is that the ' , and that the inequality hold strictly if F(·) and  
are strictly increasing. The retailer should thus exaggerate the order to the producer 
and order more than the expected demand. If the demand is stationary, or slowly 
increasing, and the production capacity is expanded in time with the demand, then 
the optimal ordering policy will be very close to the newsvendor solution. The 
same holds if the number of retailers decreases so that total demand is in balance 
with the production capacity. In all other cases variance will increase and start the 
bullwhip effect.  
* zzi ≤ ( )⋅Φ
The rationing game can play out over several layers in the supply chain. Consider a 
supply chain of three layers: a producer, multiple wholesalers and multiple 
retailers.  
If the producer announces, or appears to have, shortages in his production capacity 
the wholesalers will play the rationing game in order to get enough delivery to 
satisfy their retailers. The retailers find out about the problems and will assume that 
there may be shortages, and will play the rationing game with their respective 
wholesaler.  
Thus, demand and its variance are amplified as we move up the supply chain. 
Again all decisions can be proved rational, and even optimal, and the variance gets 
amplified and drives the bullwhip effect.  
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It can be shown (probably not easily) that if each retailer and wholesaler works 
with the demand signal processing models, and then combines them with the 
rationing games, the resulting overall bullwhip effect will be enhanced with an 
order of magnitude. This should be remembered when a fine paper producer is 
negotiating with distributors, wholesalers and retailers about implementing 
ordering and logistics solutions.  
3.3 Order Batching 
Now we need to change the context once more. Consider an inventory system with 
periodic reviews and full backlogging at a retailer. Let us assume that the demand 
is stationary, in which case the optimal order policy is to order up to S, which is 
equal to the previous review cycle's demand in every review cycle. Let us further 
assume that we have n retailers, all of which use a periodic review system with a 
review cycle of r periods, and that each retailer faces a demand pattern with mean 
m and variance . 2σ
Let us then focus on the wholesaler. From his perspective he has n retailers acting 
together through (i) random ordering, (ii) (positively) correlated ordering and (iii) 
balanced ordering, and it is evident that the use of his production capacity will be 
affected by the ordering patterns of the retailers. If all the retailers need to get their 
deliveries at exactly the same time, his production will run differently as compared 
to deliveries taking place uniformly in the order/production/delivery cycle. 
Lee et al shows that with random ordering, each retailer appears with an order 
randomly during the cycle, the demand variance as seen by the wholesaler is the 
same as the demand variance seen by the retailer, if the review cycle r = 1. If the 
review cycle is longer, the wholesaler's demand variance will always be larger and 
the bullwhip effect gets initiated.  
In the case of (positively) correlated ordering, we have an extreme situation, that 
all retailers order at exactly the same instance of the review cycle r. Lee et al shows 
that the resulting variance is much larger than the variance for random ordering. 
This is 2 quite understandable, as the wholesaler will have ordering peeks on (for 
instance) one day and nothing during the rest of the review cycle. If ordering and 
delivery policies are negotiated with retailers, a wholesaler should take care to 
avoid a situation where the retailers find it beneficial to use positively correlated 
ordering, as it for sure will drive the bullwhip effect. 
The ideal case is one in which the retailers order in a way, which is evenly 
distributed in the review cycle r. In order for this to happen, the wholesaler needs a 
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co-ordination scheme in which the retailers are organised in groups. Then all 
retailers in the same group order in a designated period within the review cycle r, 
and no other group orders in the same period. Lee et al shows that this scheme 
gives the wholesaler the smallest variance. This is reasonable, because the 
wholesaler can use his resources evenly during the review cycle and can estimate 
the order quantities to come in from each group.  
Thus, different ordering patterns generate different variances in the review period. 
Correlated ordering with all orders appearing at the same instance shows the 
largest variance. Balanced ordering with all orders perfectly co-ordinated shows 
the lowest variance, and the random ordering falls in between the two other 
patterns. In all cases Lee et al was able to prove, that the variance experienced by 
the wholesaler was larger than the variance of any chosen retailer, which shows 
that the bullwhip effect is present with all three ordering patterns.  
The ordering pattern models can be extended to a three-layer supply chain: retailer, 
wholesaler and producer, in which case we get combinations of ordering patterns 
as the wholesaler would not necessarily use the same ordering pattern as his 
retailers. The variance the producer experiences will in most cases be larger than 
the variance seen by the wholesaler. Rational decision making will force the 
wholesaler to replicate and amplify the variance he is getting from the retailers 
with his producer.  
There is an ideal case, in which the bullwhip effect can be eliminated. If the 
wholesaler can get his retailers to form one single group for the review cycle, and 
then can persuade them to agree on their total orders m (as well as agreeing among 
themselves. how to share this total amount) then there will be no bullwhip effect. 
Such a case is a bit hard to find in the forest products markets, as the EU would not 
look kindly on attempts of this kind to limit competition.  
3.4 Price Variations 
Let us change context one final time. We will assume that a retailer faces an 
independent demand Φ  for each period (but identically distributed for all 
periods). The wholesaler, the only source for the retailer, alternates between two 
prices c
)(⋅
L and cH over time. The retailer perceives that the alternating is random with 
probabilities q and (1 - q) for cL and cH respectively.  
Lee et al shows that the optimal ordering policy for the retailer is to determine two 
ordering levels, SL for cL and SH for cH . Then, as the price is low order as much as 
3 possible (i.e. SL) and as the price is high order as little as possible (i.e. SL) or 
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nothing at all. It is clear that this will drive the bullwhip effect, as it is an optimal 
policy for the retailer to allow the orders to fluctuate with the price variations. It 
can be shown that even anticipated price variations will introduce the bullwhip 
effect as it is an optimal policy to adapt orders to anticipated price variations.  
If we extend the price variations to more layers of the supply chain and include the 
producer, it is clear that the price variations reflected by the wholesaler have their 
origins with the producer. It would be an extreme, speculative case if the 
wholesaler could generate price variations on his own. Thus, the producer will face 
an optimal ordering policy from the wholesaler and find out that he gets orders 
only when he is offering the low price cL. The variance faced by the wholesaler 
gets amplified as it is passed to the producer and the bullwhip effect seen by the 
producer is much stronger. 
Inversely, it is possible to argue that if the producer refrains from price variations, 
and declares this policy publicly, then the bullwhip effect could be significantly 
reduced as the retailers would not allow the wholesalers to introduce any 
significant price variations. In the forest products market this would be possible but 
for the price variations forced by the strongly varying pulp prices, which seem to 
follow a logic of their own and which appears to be very difficult to forecast. 
4. Some properties of fuzzy numbers 
A fuzzy number A is a fuzzy set of the real line with a normal, (fuzzy) convex and 
continuous membership function of bounded support. The family of fuzzy numbers 
will be denoted by F. A −γ level set of a fuzzy number A is defined by 
[ ] }{ )( >≥ℜ∈= γγγ iftAtA 0  and [ ] }{ 0)( >ℜ∈= tAtclA γ  (the closure of the 
support of A) if 0=γ . If FA∈  a fuzzy number then [ ]γA
]1
 is a closed convex 
(compact) subset of for all ℜ ,0[∈γ  and Let us introduce the notations 
γγ γγ ]max[)(,]min[)( 21 AaAa ==  
In other words, )(1 γa  denotes the left-hand side and )(2 γa  denotes the right-hand 
side of the −γ cut. We shall use the notation 
)].(),([][ 21 γγγ aaA =  
The support of A is the open interval (a1(0), a2(0)).  
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Let  and [  be fuzzy numbers and let )](),([][ 21 γγγ aaA =
ℜ
)].(),([] 21 γγγ bbB =
∈λ  be a real number. Using the extension principle we can verify the following 
rules for addition and scalar multiplication of fuzzy numbers  
γγγ λλγγγγ ][][)],()(),()([][ 2211 AAbabaBA =++=+  
 
Definition 4.1. A fuzzy set A is called triangular fuzzy number with peak (or 
center) a, left width 0>α  and right width 0>β  if its membership function has 
the following form 







+≤≤−−
≤≤−−−
=
otherwise
ataifat
ataifta
tA
0
1
1
)( ββ
αα
 
 
and we use the notation ).,,( βαaA =  It can easily be verified that  
].1,0[],)1(,)1([][ ∈∀−+−−= γβγαγγ aaA  
A triangular fuzzy number with center a may be seen as a fuzzy quantity ''x is 
approximately equal to a''. 
 
 
  1 
 
 
       a-α               a                                 a+β 
Figure 3: Triangular fuzzy number. 
 
Let A and B be fuzzy numbers with [  and [ . )](),([] 21 γγγ aaA = )](),([] 21 γγγ bbB =
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We metricize the set of fuzzy numbers by the Hausdorff-metric  
 
( )
[ ]
( ) ( ){ ( ) ( ) }.,maxsup, 2211
1,0
γγγγ
γ
babaBAH −−=
∈
 
 
i.e. H(A,B) is the maximal distance between the α -level sets of A and B. For 
example, if ),( αaA =  and ),( αbB =  are fuzzy numbers of symmetric triangular 
form with the same width 0>α  then H(A,B) = |a - b|, and if ),( αaA =  and 
),( βbB =  then  
.),( βα −+−= baBAH  
Let  be a fuzzy number with [ , FA∈ )](),([] 21 γγγ aaA = ∈γ [0,1]. We shall use 
the Goetschel-Voxman defuzzification method [4] to define E(A), the mean (or 
expected) value of A by  
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ,2 1
0
211
0
1
0
21
∫∫
∫
+=
+⋅
= γγγγ
γγ
γγγγ
daa
d
daa
AE  
 
i.e. the weight of the arithmetic mean of ( ) ( )γγ 21 aanda  is just γ . It is easy to 
see that if ( )βα ,,aA =  is a triangular fuzzy number then 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] .
6
11
1
0
αβγβγαγγ −+=−++−−= ∫ adaaAE  
 
Specially, when A = (a, α ) is a symmetric triangular fuzzy number we get E(A) = 
a.  
It can be shown [1] that E: ℜ→F  is a linear function (with respect to addition 
and multiplication by scalar of fuzzy numbers).  
 
Theorem 4.1. Let [  and [  be fuzzy numbers 
and let 
)](),([] 21 γγγ aaA = )](),([] 21 γγγ bbB =
∈λ R be a real number. Then  
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)()(),()()( AEAEBEAEBAE λλ =+=+ , 
 
where the addition and multiplication by a scalar of fuzzy numbers is defined by 
the sup-min extension principle [9].  
 
In [1] we introduced the (possibilistic) variance of A∈F as  
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )∫
∫
∫
∫
−=






 −++

 −+=






 −+≥+






 −+≤=
1
0
2
12
1
0
2
2
21
2
1
21
2
2
21
1
0
2
2
1
21
1
0
1
.
2
1
22
2
2
γγγγ
γγγγγγγγ
γγγγγ
γγγγγ
daa
daaaaaa
daaaaAPos
daaaaAPosAVar
 
 
The variance of A is defined as the expected value of the squared deviations 
between the arithmetic mean and the endpoints of its level sets, i.e. the lower 
possibility-weighted average of the squared distance between the left-hand 
endpoint and the arithmetic mean of the endpoints of its level sets plus the upper 
possibility-weighted average of the squared distance between the right-hand 
endpoint and the arithmetic mean of the end- points their of its level sets. The 
standard deviation of A is defined by  
 
( ).AVarA =σ  
 
For example, if A = (a, α, β) is a triangular fuzzy number then  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) . 
24
11
2
1 21
0
2 βαγγαγβγ +=−−−−+= ∫ daaAVar
 
especially, if A = (a, α) is a symmetric triangular fuzzy number then 
 
( ) .
6
2α=AVar  
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If A is the characteristic function of the crisp interval [a, b] then  
 
( ) ( ) 21
0
2
22
1 

 −=−= ∫ abdabAVar γγ  
 
that is,  
 
( ) .
2
,
2
baAEabA
+=−=σ  
 
In probability theory, the corresponding result is: if the two possible outcomes of a 
probabilistic variable have equal probabilities then the expected value is their 
arithmetic mean and the standard deviation is the half of their distance.  
The covariance between fuzzy numbers A and B is defined as  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) γγγγγγ dbbaaBACov 12
1
0
122
1, −−= ∫  
 
The covariance measures how much the endpoints of the γ-level sets of two fuzzy 
numbers move in tandem. Let A = (a, α) and B = (b, β) be symmetric triangular 
fuzzy numbers. Then  
 
.
6
),( αβ=BACov
 
 
In [1] we showed that the variance of linear combinations of fuzzy numbers can be 
computed in the same manner as in probability theory.  
 
Theorem 4.2.  Let λ,µ ∈   and let A and B be fuzzy numbers. Then ℜ
 
 Var(λA + µB) = λ2 Var(A) + µ2 Var(B) + 2|λµ|Cov(A, B) 
 
where the addition and multiplication by a scalar of fuzzy numbers is defined by 
the sup-min extension principle.  
 
As a special case of Theorem 4.2 we get Var(λA) = λ2Var(A) for any λ∈  and ℜ
 
Var(A+B) = Var(A) +Var(B) + 2Cov(A,B).  
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Another important question is the relationship between the subsethood and the 
variance of fuzzy numbers. One might expect that A ⊂ B (that is A(x)  B(x) for all 
x∈ ) should imply the relationship Var(A) 
≤
ℜ ≤  Var(B) because A is considered a 
''stronger restriction'' than B. The following theorem [1] shows that subsethood 
does entail smaller variance.  
Theorem 4.3. Let A, B ∈ F with A ⊂  B. Then Var(A) ≤  Var(B). 
5. A fuzzy approach to demand signal processing 
Let us consider equation (1) with trapezoidal fuzzy numbers  
 
( )( ) .0101001*1 11 DDDDSSz
v
+−−
−=+−= −
+
ρ
ρρ    (2) 
 
Then from Theorem 4.2 we get 
 
( ) ( ) (
( )
)
( ) ( .,
1
12
1
1)(
0010
1
010
21
*
1
DVarDDDCov
DVarDDVarzVar
>−−
−+
+−


−
−=
−
+
+
ρ
ρρ
ρ
ρρ
ν
ν
)
 
 
so the simple adaptation of the probabilistic model (i.e. the replacement of 
probabilistic distributions by possibilistic ones) does not reduce the bullwhip 
effect.  
We will show, however that by including better and better estimates of future sales 
in period one, D1 , we can reduce the variance of z1 by replacing the old rule for 
ordering (2) with an adjusted rule. Suppose now that a sequence of ,  i = 1, 2, . . 
. can be derived such that 
iD1
 
( ) ( )ji DDHDDH 1111 ,, ≤     if  ,ji ≥  
i.e.  is a better estimation of DiD1 1 than  if  i  j. We can reduce the variance of 
z
jD1 ≥
1 by replacing the old rule for ordering (2) with the adjusted rule 
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  ( )( ) .
1
1
1010
1
1
ii DDDDz ∩

 +−−
−= −
+
ρ
ρρ ν    
 
Really, from Theorem 4.3 and from  
 
( )( )
1
1 *
11010
1
1 zDDDDz
ii ⊂∩

 +−−
−= −
+
ρ
ρρ ν ,   (3) 
we get 
),()( *11 zVarzVar
i <  
 
which means that the variance of the suggested optimal order, , is getting smaller 
and smaller as  is getting sharper and sharper. The crisp value of the optimal 
order is defined that the most typical value of , that is, its expected value, E( ). 
iz1
iD1
iz1
iz1
It can be seen that, similarly to the probabilistic case, Var( ) is a strictly 
increasing function of the replenishment lead time 
iz1ν . However if ν  = 0 then 
equation (3) reads 
( )[ ] ii DDDDz 10101 ∩+−= −ρ  
 
and, furthermore, if ρ tends to zero then 
 
)()( 101 DDVarzVar
i ∩→  
 
that is, the bullwhip effect can be completely eliminated. 
6. A fuzzy logic controller to demand signal processing 
If the participants of the supply chain do not share information, or they do not 
agree on the value of D1 then we can apply a neural fuzzy system that uses an error 
correction learning procedure to predict z1. This system should include historical 
data, and a supervisor who is in the position to derive some initial linguistical rules 
from past situations which would have reduced the bullwhip effect.  
A typical fuzzy logic controller (FLC) describes the relationship between the 
change of the control ∆u(t) = u(t) - u(t-1) on the one hand, and the error e(t) (the 
difference between the desired and computed system output) and its change 
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 ∆e(t) = e(t) - e(t-1).  
 
on the other hand. The actual output of the controller u(t) is obtained from the 
previous value of control u(t-1) that is updated by ∆u(t). This type of controller was 
suggested originally by Mamdani and Assilian in 1975 and is called the 
Mamdani-type FLC. A prototypical rule-base of a simple FLC realising with three 
linguistic values {negative, zero, positive} is listed in the following 
 
1ℜ :  If    e is ''positive'' and ∆e is ''near zero''     then ∆u is ''positive''  
2ℜ :  If    e is ''negative'' and ∆e is ''near zero''    then ∆u is ''negative''  
3ℜ :  If    e is ''near zero'' and ∆e is ''near zero''   then ∆u is ''near zero''  
4ℜ :  If    e is ''near zero'' and ∆e is ''positive''     then ∆u is ''positive''  
5ℜ :  If    e is ''near zero'' and ∆e is ''negative''    then ∆u is ''negative''  
 
Or in tabular form 
 
∆e(t) | e(t) → N ZE P 
↓ 
N  N ZE P 
ZE N ZE P 
P ZE P P 
 
 
 
                           N                    error     ZE                       P 
 
 
        Figure 4: Initial membership functions for the error. 
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To easy the bullwhip effect we suggest the use of a fuzzy logic controller. Demand 
realizations Dt-1 and Dt-2 denote the volumes of retail sales in periods t - 1 and t - 2, 
respectively. We use a FLC to determine the change in order, denoted by ∆z1, in 
order to reduce the bullwhip effect, that is, the variance of z1. We shall derive z1 
from D0 , D-1 (sales data in the last two periods) and from the last order z0 as 
101 zzz ∆+=  
where the crisp value of ∆z1 is derived from the rule base { }51 ...,, ℜℜ , where e = 
D0 - z0 is the difference between the past realized demand (sales), D0 and order z0, 
and the change of error 
 
( ) ( )11001: −−− −−−=−=∆ zDzDeee  
 
is the change between (D0 - z0) and (D-1 – z-1).  
To improve the performance (approximation ability) we can include more 
historical data Dt-3, Dt-4 … in the antecedent part of the rules. The problem is that 
the fuzzy system itself can not learn the membership function of ∆z1, so we should 
include a neural network to approximate the crisp value of z1, which is the most 
typical value of z0 + ∆z1.  
It is here when the supervisor should provide crisp historical learning patterns for 
the concrete problem, for example, 
 
{30, 5, 20} 
 
which says us that if at some past situations (Dk-1 - zk-1) was 30 and (Dk-2 - zk-2) was 
5 then the value of zk should have been (zk-1 - 20) in order to reduce the bullwhip 
effect.  
The meaning of this pattern can be interpreted as: if the preceding chain member 
ordered a little bit less than it sold in period (k-2) and much less in period (k-1) 
then its order for period k should have been enlarged by 20 in order to reduce the 
bullwhip effect (otherwise - at a later time - the order from this member would 
unexpectedly jump in order to meet his customers' demand - and that is the 
bullwhip phenomena).  
Then the output of the neural fuzzy numbers is computed as the most typical value 
of the fuzzy system, and the system parameters (i.e. the shape functions of the 
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error, change in error and change in order) are learned by the generalized δ  
learning rule (the error backpropagation algorithm).  
7. Summary and Conclusions 
The results reached in the EM-S Bullwhip project are mainly theoretical results, 
which also was the objective for the research program.  
Nevertheless, many of the results we have found in working with both the standard 
Lee et al model and with the new EM-S Bullwhip model have practical 
implications. Even if we propose them as ''ways to handle the bullwhip effect for 
paper mills'', it should be clear that significant validation and verification work 
remains to be done before this statement will be fully true. The validation and 
verification process requires access to specific data on real market operations, 
preferably on the paper mill level.  
As a tool for the verification and validation process, we built a prototype of a 
decision support system in which we have implemented causal models, which 
describe the four bullwhip-driving factors. The system is a platform for testing 
different policy solutions with the bullwhip models, for collecting data from 
different data sources with intelligent agents, which also update the models, and for 
running simulations of the processes involved with the PowerSim software 
package.  
Nevertheless, quite some work is needed for re-engineering the logistics chain and 
getting its operators to agree on sharing information. This is essential, as we can 
hope to eliminate the bullwhip effect only to some degree if we have to keep 
estimating the activities of the supply chain operators. 
If this negotiating process gets complex and time-consuming, a business unit can 
still work with the bullwhip effect internally by following up on its demand and 
sales pat- terns, and by trying to find ways to neutralise the most violent variations. 
For this purpose, the mathematical results we have found will be most useful. This 
work can be combined with running experiments with different solutions with the 
help of the PowerSim models. 
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